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STATE REGULATION OF FEDERALLY
CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
WASHINGTON'S ANTI-REDLINING ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Washington joined the small but growing number of juris-
dictions which have enacted "anti-redlining" laws.' The term "redlin-
ing ' 2 graphically describes the practice of denying mortgage or home
improvement loans or demanding more onerous terms3 for such loans
based solely on the location of the mortgaged home.4 Because the ur-
1. Financial Institutions Disclosure Act-Fairness in Lending Act, ch. 301. 1977
Wash. Laws 1111 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.106 & §§ 30.04.500-.515 (Supp.
1977)). See notes 19-41 and accompanying text infra for a description of the act. The
federal government and several other states and cities have also enacted laws or regula-
tions intended to eliminate redlining. See notes 42-57 (federal law) & 58-66 (state
laws) and accompanying text infra. See generally Ryan, Banking Law, 1977 ANN. SUR-
VEY AM. L. 57 (survey of anti-redlining measures). The vast amount of testimony and
material presented to the Senate committee considering the federal Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act underscores the depth of community concern about the problem of red-
lining. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1281 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Parts I
& 2) (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
2. The term derives from the apocryphal practice of mortgage lenders drawing red
lines around designated "no loan" areas on city maps. Note, Redlining-The Fight
Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. CHi. LJ. 71, 72 (1975).
3. Variances from standard mortgage terms include requiring higher down pay-
ments, imposing higher interest rates, using shorter repayment periods, or charging dis-
count points. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 35 (prepared statement of Gov.
Walker of Illinois); Duncan, Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation,
and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB.
LAW. 510, 513-14 (1975).
4. E.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-2 (opening statement of Committee
Chairman, Senator Proxmire); Note, Attacking tize Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.
L. REV. 989 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Attacking Urban Redlining]. The majority of
discussions of redlining in the legal literature conclude that redlining is a severe prob-
lem not adequately addressed by existing legislation. See note 17 infra for a partial list
of recent commentaries. One author, however, has argued that "redlining" by mortgage
lenders is not a primary cause of neighborhood decline and urban decay but only a pru-
dent money-management response to areas posing high risks due to other factors and
therefore, that inflexible anti-redlining and disclosure laws are unwise. Van Alstyne,
Redlining-The Cure Worse than the Illness, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 264, 266, 270-71 (1977).
But see Note, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Will It Protect Urban Con-
sumers from Redlining?, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 957, 958-63 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as HMDA Urban Consumer Protection].
Lending institutions undeniably feel they are obligated to protect their depositors'
and shareholders' interests against unduly risky investments. See, e.g., Attacking Urban
Redlining, supra at 991.
Urban redlining focuses upon the relationship between mortgage risk and the loca-
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ban neighborhoods subject to redlining generally have significant
minority populations, and because the mortgage applicants denied
credit are frequently members of minority groups, strictly geographic
redlining often becomes part of the larger problem of mortgage dis-
crimination based on race. 5 Racial redlining can be attacked on the
basis of fair housing laws or other civil rights legislation.t i In geo-
graphic redlining, however, race may not be a factor, 7 or if it is a fac-
tion of the collateral. When a lender redlines a neighborhood. it determines that the
characteristics of the neighborhood render default unacceptably probable and that
the subsequent sale of the property will not yield a price at least equal to the loan's
outstanding balance. Lenders rely on this determination regardless of the credit
standing of the potential borrower or the condition of the building offered as collat-
eral.
Id. at 993. Since mortgage loans are typically long term, there is an incentive for the
lender to leave a large margin of error when estimating the probability of default or
substantial depreciation in property value. See generally Ryan. supra note I. at 58:
Comment, Redlining in Mortgage Lending: California's Approach to Getting the Red
Out, 8 PAC. L.J. 699, 729-30 (1977).
Whether redlining is the initiating cause of neighborhood decline or merely an effect
thereof, it still may justly be attacked. For redlining in response to what are perceived as
the first signs of decline nevertheless contributes to the decline and indeed renders it
inevitable: without money to finance renovation and purchases by new residents, neigh-
borhoods deteriorate. See, e.g., Attacking Urban Redlining, supra at 1005-06.
A recent study seriously challenges the methodology of previous empirical studies of
redlining, thus casting doubt upon the prevailing assumption that geographic redlining
is a serious problem. G. Benston, The Anti-Redlining Rules: An Analysis of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board's Proposed Nondiscrimination Requirements 8-9 (1978) (Law
and Economics Center, Univ. of Miami). Professor Benston also reports the findings of
a study of redlining in Rochester, New York. designed to avoid the methodological
flaws of earlier work. Those findings do not support the claim that there is extensive
mortgage discrimination based on the age and/or location of the house. Id. at I 1- 13. See
also Clark, Regulating Redlining, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1978. at 6. col. 3. The FHLBB's
nondiscrimination regulations are discussed in notes 46 and 151 infra.
5. Denial of mortgages because of location (redlining) should also be distinguished
from "mortgage disinvestment," which refers to the transfer of capital from areas where
it is collected to different areas for investment. Money collected by savings deposits in
area A is not reinvested in mortgages in area A but disinvested to area B where the re-
turn is thought to be higher and/or safer. See, e.g., Attacking Urban Redlining, supra
note 4, at 996-97.
6. See, e.g., Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893. 896
(N.D. Ohio 1977) (plaintiffs alleging racial redlining as basis for denial of mortgage
prevailed under 1968 Fair Housing Act): Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co.. 408 F.
Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (white applicants denied mortgage solely because
house was in a racially integrated area have a cause of action under the 1968 Fair Hous-
ing Act §§ 804 & 805. as amended 42 U.S.C. §§3604, 3605 (1976)).
7. Attacking Urban Redlining, supra note 4, at 990. The factors which mortgage ap-
praisers use include nonracial ones such as the age of the house, crime rate, and charac-
teristics of neighboring areas. Id. at 994-95. Moreover, redlining is not confined only to
the poorest neighborhoods; working class and middle income areas can also be affected.
Id. at 990.
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tor, it is difficult to establish. But even apart from its racially discrimi-
natory impact, redlining is socially harmful and should be subject to
legal remedy because it contributes to the deterioration of
neighborhoods by denying mortgage credit in specific areas.
Prohibition of discrimination based on location and public disclo-
sure of mortgage information have been believed to be effective mea-
sures against redlining. Thus, in the Financial Institutions Disclosure
Act and the Fairness in Lending Act of 1977,8 the Washington State
legislature prohibited redlining9 and provided for disclosure of mort-
gage data to the secretary of state and to the public.1 0 These
provisions were expressly made applicable to federally chartered fi-
nancial institutions within the state as well as to state chartered insti-
tutions." 1
It is long settled that the federal government has paramount au-
thority over federally chartered financial institutions.1 2 McCulloch v.
Maryland'3 established this rule for national banks. Federal savings
and loan associations have similar status. 14 Constitutionally derived
limits, therefore, are imposed on state legislation affecting federally
chartered financial institutions. 15 Washington's anti-redlining statute
may have overstepped those limits; it recently was held inapplicable
to federal savings and loan associations in Washington Savings
League v. Chapman.16
8. Financial Institutions Disclosure Act-Fairness in Lending Act, ch. 301, 1977
Wash. Laws 111 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.106 & §9 30.04.500-.515 (Supp.
1977)). See notes 19-41 and accompanying text infra for a description of the act. In this
comment, "Financial Institutions Disclosure Act" is used to refer to the entire anti-red-
lining act in the session laws; "Mortgage Disclosure Act" refers to the disclosure provi-
sions; and "Fairness in Lending Act" refers to the prohibition of redlining. See notes
19-22 and accompanying text infra.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.510(1) (Supp. 1977).
10. WASH. REV. CODE 99 19.106.030 & .050 (Supp. 1977).
11. WAsH. REV. CODE §9 19.106.020(3) & 30.04.505(1) (Supp. 1977).
12. E.g., Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
14. E.g., United States v. Harper, 241 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1957); Durnin v. Al-
lentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963); California v.
Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311. 318-19 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
15. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869) (state laws
which infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the perform-
ance of the banks' functions are impermissible).
16. Washington Say. League v. Chapman, No. C 78-163S (W.D. Wash., Jan. 17,
1979) (order granting motions for summary judgment and permanent injunction). The
magistrate's earlier recommendation and the order granting preliminary injunction are
reprinted in 44 LEGAL BULL. 290-92 (1978). In Washington Savings League a group of
federal savings and loan associations in the state of Washington and their trade associa-
tion challenged, on the basis of federal preemption, the validity of the application of the
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The purpose of this comment is to analyze the law on state regula-
tion of federal financial institutions and then to apply that analysis to
the Washington act in order to determine whether the act can validly
be applied to national banks and federal savings and loan associa-
tions. 17 Part II critically describes the Washington act and compares
state anti-redlining law to them and sought to enjoin the secretary of state and the attor-
ney general from enforcing it against federal associations. The court held that federal
law and regulations did preempt and that accordingly the state act was inapplicable to
federal savings and loan associations. See notes 137 & 153 infra.
Long before suit was filed, the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). the federal regulatory agency for federal savings and loan
associations, sent an opinion letter to the Washington Savings League, stating that "'the
statute as a matter of federal law does not apply to federally-chartered S & Ls." Letter
from Daniel Goldberg, Acting General Counsel, to Robert L. Shults. President. Wash-
ington Savings League at I (July 22. 1977) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
Consider a similar New Jersey letter cited in note 66 infra. The FHLBB's letter
prompted enough community concern to lead The Seattle Timnes editorially to question
the FHLBB's view and to urge federal institutions to comply with the state measure.
Seattle Times. Dec. 30. 1977, at A 12, col. I. Immediately before suit was filed, the state
attorney general's office issued a letter opinion stating that the state disclosure act is
constitutionally applicable to federal institutions. AGLO 1978 No. 2. at I (Feb. 14.
1978).
17. This comment will not duplicate areas already treated. Recent discussions of
redlining in the legal literature have described redlining practices and their impact on
urban areas and surveyed possible responses by lending institutions and the legal sys-
tem. See, e.g., Earthman. Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course through the
Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REV. 957 (1976); Givens. The "Antiredlining" Issue:
Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING LJ. 515 (1978); Renne. Eliminating Red-
lining by Judicial Action: Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1976); Sie-
bert. Urban Investmnent Problems: How Banking Institutions and Supervisory Agencies
Can Help, 95 BANKING L.J. 444 (1978); Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvest-
mnent): The Parameters of Federal, State, and Municipal Regulation, 54 U. DET. J. URB.
L. 367 (1977); Comment, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 463 (1976); Note, FHA "Redlining"-Inflexible Agency Guidelines De-
feat Congressional Intent for the 223(e)"Acceptable Risk" Program, 19 ARIz. L. REV.
919 (1977); Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. REV. 989 (1976);
Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
110 (1976); Note, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 83 (1976); Comment, Redlining: Why Make A Federal Case Out of It, 6
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 813 (1976); Note, Redlining-The Fight Against Discrimination
in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. Cim. L.J. 71 (1975); Comment. A Proposal for Eliminat-
ing Redlining: The Missouri Financial Institutions Disclosure Act of 1976, 20 ST. Louis
L.J. 722 (1976); Comment, Mortgage Discrimination-Eliminating Racial Discrimina-
tion in Home Financing through the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 139
(1975). See also Ryan, supra note I (descriptive survey of state and federal legislation
on redlining); Note, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act of 1975, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1074 (1978); Note, The Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act of 1975: Will it Protect Urban Consumersfrom Redlining?, 12 NEW ENGLAND
L. REV. 957 (1977) (describing and criticising HMDA, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1976));
Comment, Red-lining and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A Decisive Step
toward Private Urban Redevelopment, 25 EMORY L.J. 667 (1976); Comment. Redlin-
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it with federal law on the same subject. Part III surveys the judicially
developed limits on state regulation of federal financial institutions.
Part IV then considers the validity of the Washington act as applied to
federal financial institutions in light of the judicial limits discussed in
Part 111.18 The comment concludes that the state prohibition of dis-
crimination based on location is constitutionally applicable to na-
tional banks but is inapplicable to federal savings and loan associa-
tions. The comment further concludes that no federally chartered
financial institution can be compelled to comply with the mortgage
disclosure provision of the state act. Finally, a more limited version of
the mortgage disclosure provision which may avoid constitutional in-
firmities is proposed.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL ANTI-REDLINING LAWS
A. Washington's Financial Institutions Disclosure Act
Although the entire anti-redlining law is contained in a single chap-
ter of the session laws,19 it contains two distinct parts which are in-
tended to be treated separately. 20 The first part, requiring lending in-
stitutions to disclose information concerning their lending practices,
will be referred to as the Mortgage Disclosure Act.21 The second part,
ing in Mortgage Lending: California's Approach to Getting the Red Out, 8 PAC. LJ.
699 (1977) (describing exhaustive administrative disclosure regulations of California).
18. The Washington mortgage disclosure and redlining prohibition act is only one
instance of the problem of states regulating federal financial institutions. The problem
will recur as states continue to enact antidiscrimination and consumer protection laws
with potential application to financial institutions. For example, Washington's Con-
sumer Protection Act prohibits a variety of unfair practices and gives the state attorney
general enforcement power. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.86 (1976). Although the law spe-
cifically exempts "actions or transactions permitted by any other regulatory body or of-
ficer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States," WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.86.170 (1976), it may in some circumstances apply to federal financial insti-
tutions. It is not self-evident that national banks and federal savings and loan associa-
tions are sufficiently under the regulatory aegis of their respective federal regulatory
agencies to come within the exemption in all circumstances, Cf. State v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wn. 2d 259, 279-80, 501 P.2d 290, 303 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411
U.S. 945 (1973). There, the Federal Trade Commission, which had permitted the
Reader's Digest Sweepstakes under challenge by the state, was held not to be a "regula-
tory body" within the meaning of R.C.W. § 19.86.170; therefore the Sweepstakes did
not qualify for an exemption and the state law applied, despite the Commission's per-
mission.
19. Ch. 301, 1977 Wash. Laws 1111 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.106 & §§
30.04.500-.515 (Supp. 1977)).
20. The separate codification in R.C.W., as directed by the Act, indicates this. Ch.
301, §§ 15-16, 1977 Wash. Laws 1115.
21. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.106 (Supp. 1977)). The short title is Financial Institu-
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declaring discrimination in mortgage lending to be unlawful when
based on the location of the home, will be referred to as the Fairness
in Lending Act.22
1. Mortgage disclosure provisions
The Mortgage Disclosure Act requires each financial institution
within the scope of the act to file reports containing specified infor-
mation about the lender's mortgage loans in each covered neighbor-
hood.2 3 Institutions are subject to the act if they have a home office or
branch within a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). 24 A
neighborhood is covered if it is wholly or partially within a SMSA.25
The act is expressly applicable to federal institutions.2 6 Each covered
tions Disclosure Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.010 (Supp. 1977)). In this comment.
however. "Financial Institutions Disclosure Act" is used to refer to the entire act in the
session laws, and "Mortgage Disclosure Act" is used to refer to the disclosure provi-
sions of R.C.W. ch. 19.106.
22. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.04.500-.515 (Supp. 1977)). The short title is the Fair-
ness in Lending Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.500 (Supp. 1977)).
23. Mortgage disclosure is required on the theory that it will make members of the
community conscious of the lending practices of area financial institutions and allow
them to respond accordingly. for example, by not patronizing institutions which redline.
This market pressure may encourage lenders to alter their behavior. See HMDA Urban
Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 976. Senator Proxmire gave a similar explana-
tion of the purpose of the HMDA. 121 CONG. REC. 18882-83 (1975). One aspect of this
rationale was incorporated into the text of the federal statute. 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b)
(1976) (information disclosed will guide government officials' use of public funds and
enable citizens to determine whether lending institutions are fulfilling community
needs).
24. A SMSA is a county or group of contiguous counties containing at least one
city of 50.000 or more, or one city of at least 25,000 which together with contiguous
densely populated places has a combined population of 50.000 or more, provided the
county or counties in which the city and surrounding places are located has a total popu-
lation of at least 75,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 923 (98th ed. 1977). Washington has four
SMSA's: Seattle-Everett (King and Snohomish counties). Tacoma (Pierce county). Spo-
kane (Spokane county). and Yakima (Yakima county); in addition. Vancouver (Clark
county) is part of the Portland. Oregon SMSA. Id. at 926-3 1.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(1) (Supp. 1977). A "neighborhood" is an area
designated by a census tract or by a ZIP code where there is no census tract designation.
Id. § 19.106.020(6).
26. The statute defines "financial institution" as follows:
"Financial institution" means any bank or trust company, mutual savings bank.
savings and loan association or credit union which operates or has a place of busi-
ness in this state whether or not regulated by the state or federal government and
which has more than ten million dollars in assets, and any mortgage company
which operates or has a place of business in this state.
Id. § 19.106.020(3) (emphasis added). The meaning of "whether or not regulated" is un-
clear because all of these institutions are regulated. The comparable provision of the
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institution must file mortgage disclosure reports annually with the sec-
retary of state on forms promulgated by the secretary. 27 The state-
ments are to be available for public inspection and copying.28 Failure
to submit the required statement on time renders the lending institu-
tion liable to a fine.29 The attorney general has power of enforcement
for violations of the disclosure requirement.30
The information which lenders must include in these reports is
extensive. 31 Under the state law, lenders must report for each covered
neighborhood: (1) the number and aggregate amount of loans owned
or serviced, 32 (2) the number and aggregate dollar amount of applica-
Fairness in Lending Act omits the "or not" language. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.505(1)
(Supp. 1977). The minimum assets provision spares smaller institutions the burden of
compiling reports. Small institutions nonetheless are prohibited from redlining since the
Fairness in Lending Act does not contain a minimum assets provision. Id.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(1), .040 (Supp. 1977). The provisions became
effective July 1, 1977 and reports were due within 90 days after the end of each financial
institution's fiscal year. Thus, for most institutions, the first deadline was March 3 1,
1978, for reports for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1977. For federal savings and
loan associations, however, a preliminary injunction against enforcement took effect on
March 30, 1978. Washington Say. League v. Chapman, No. C 78-163S (W.D. Wash.
March 30. 1978) (order granting preliminary injunction). See note 16 supra (final order
in Washington Savings League).
28. The statements are to be available for public inspection at the secretary of
state's office; the secretary is to provide copies to any interested person at cost. Each fi-
nancial institution must have a copy of its statement available for inspection at each of-
fice within a SMSA. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.050 (Supp. 1977). Public access would
be increased, and disclosure made more effective, if copies could be obtained directly
from the institutions rather than the secretary's office and if there were a central loca-
tion in each city where the disclosures, and therefore the redlining record, of the various
institutions of that city could be compared. Cf. note 48 infra (public availability
provisions of comparable federal act).
29. WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.106.060(l) (Supp. 1977). The fine is $500 or $100 per
day for each day overdue, whichever is greater. Id.
30. Id. This provision, in conjunction with the provision requiring institutions to
file the reports with the secretary of state, see note 27 supra, is important in the context
of federal financial institutions because it gives state officials a form of supervisory au-
thority over the federal institutions. See notes 138-44 and accompanying text infra.
Persons who knowingly file a false or misleading statement are guilty of a gross misde-
meanor. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.060(2) (Supp. 1977).
31. The Washington Mortgage Disclosure Act requires much more extensive infor-
mation than does the federal act. The federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
requires disclosure of only the number and total dollar amount of mortgage and home
improvement loans originated or purchased in each geographic area. 12 U.S.C. §
2803(a)(1) (1976). See notes 51-52 and accompanying text infra. The data are also to be
set out separately for each of several different categories of loans; the Washington act
requires disclosure by several categories in addition to those required under federal
law. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(2) (Supp. 1977) with 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)
(1976).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1977).
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tions processed and rejected, 33 (3) the number and amount of loans
closed, 34 and (4) the number of foreclosures and loans in default for
the reporting period. 35
2. Fairness in lending provisions
The Fairness in Lending Act 36 declares it "unlawful for any finan-
cial institution, in processing any application for a loan to be secured
by a single-family residence to [deny] or vary the terms of a loan on
the basis that a specific parcel of real estate offered as security is lo-
cated in a specific geographic area . . . ."37 Varying the terms of a
loan includes such practices as demanding a greater down payment,
imposing higher interest rates, or requiring a shorter repayment pe-
riod than is usual. 38 The definition of financial institution in this act
also expressly extends to federally chartered institutions. 39 The act's
broad prohibition is severely qualified by a proviso stating that finan-
cial institutions may consider "sound underwriting practices in pro-
cessing any application for a loan to any person." 40 Since lenders usu-
33. Id. § 19.106.030(l)(c). This is a key provision, for discriminatory redlining is
more easily discerned by knowing the number of applications made but rejected in a
particular area. The federal requirement of data disclosing only the aggregate number
and amount of loans actually made is inadequate, since it fails to account for differ-
ences in level of demand for mortgages in different areas. E.g., G. Benston. supra note
4. at 9. The federal HMDA does not require information about loan applications and
rejections. See notes 51 & 52 infra.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(l)(d) (Supp. 1977).
35. Id. § 19.106.030(l)(e)-(f). The information regarding foreclosures and loans in
default will provide data which may resolve the argument that certain areas pose unac-
ceptably high risks.
36. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.04.500-.515 (Supp. 1977).
37. Id. § 30.04.510(1). "Single-family residence" is not defined in the Fairness in
Lending Act. It is defined in the Mortgage Disclosure Act as a residence of one to four
dwelling units. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.020(8) (Supp. 1977).
Under the Fairness in Lending Act it is also unlawful to "[u] tilize lending standards
that have no economic basis." WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.510(2) (Supp. 1977). This is a
requirement of great generality and indeterminate application.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.505(3) (Supp. 1977). The strict prohibition of"vary-
ing the terms of the loan" raises interesting questions whether a government program to
foster urban rehabilitation by charging lower interest rates, requiring no down pay-
ment, or using less stringent underwriting standards in designated urban neighborhoods
would violate this law. Mortgage applicants in areas not selected for such programs may
claim that they are being treated less favorably because of geographic location. Michi-
gan's anti-redlining law implicitly recognizes this problem and expressly states that such
programs are not in violation of the statute. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.1125(4) (1978).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.505(1) (Supp. 1977). See note 26 and accompanying
text supra.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.515 (Supp. 1977).
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ally will contend that mortgages are denied in certain areas only
because those areas have a higher risk and for other prudent eco-
nomic reasons,41 it is unclear to what extent the practices contem-
plated by the prohibition, as thus restricted, actually occur.
B. Federal Anti-Redlining Law
Concern over redlining and the lack of adequate mortgage credit in
urban areas led Congress to enact the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
of 1975 (HMDA).42 As the title indicates, the act requires disclosure
of mortgage loan information. 43 It does not prohibit redlining.44 This
deficiency has been criticized, 45 and recently, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, by amending its nondiscrimination regulations, has pro-
hibited redlining by savings and loan associations. 46 Congress showed
41. For a summary of the rational economic considerations potentially involved,
see G. Benston, supra note 4, at 2-4.
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976).
43. The theory of disclosure as a remedy is that with full information consumers (in-
dividual depositors or public officials with government deposits) will exert market pres-
sure by depositing with institutions which make loans in the community and avoiding
those which do not. See note 23 supra. This approach has been criticized as inadequate
to solve the problems it addresses. E.g., Attacking Urban Redlining, supra note 4, at
1009; HMDA Urban Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 984-86.
44. Where the mortgage denial is based on the racial characteristics of the neighbor-
hood, other federal remedies are applicable. See note 6 supra. The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System asserts that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f (1976), provides a cause of action for redlining victims if a mortgage ap-
plicant is discriminated against on the basis of the racial, religious, or ethnic characteris-
tics of the neighborhood in which the property is located. [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 24,678 (summary of letter of June 24, 1977).
45. See, e.g., HMDA Urban Consumer Protection, supra note 4, at 987-88.
46. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the federal regulatory agency
for federal savings and loan associations, amended its nondiscrimination regulations to
include a prohibition of geographic redlining. Under the amended regulations, federal
savings and loan associations are barred from denying mortgage loans because of the
age of the dwelling or the neighborhood where located. 43 Fed. Reg. 22,332-39 (1978)
(final amendments to 12 C.F.R. Parts 528 & 531). See also 42 Fed. Reg. 58,953-56
(1977) (proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. Part 528 & § 531.8). Moreover, the Board
expressly intends "that Federally-chartered savings and loan institutions shall be gov-
erned solely by these regulations." 43 Fed. Reg. 22,333 (1978) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the preemptive impact of these regulations, see notes 151-53 and accom-
panying text infra.
In a related area, the FHLBB, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, pursuant to a settlement agreement in a recent suit,
agreed to intensify their monitoring of compliance with the Fair Housing Act by devel-
oping a computer based data-collection system including information about the race,
sex, age, and marital status of applicants for housing loans and the location of the prop-
erty. The information will be available to the public. National Urban League v. Office
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further concern for the lack of credit available in some neighborhoods
by enacting the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 47 which is
intended to increase lending institutions' responsiveness to community
needs.
The disclosure format of the HMDA is similar to that of the Wash-
ington act. Mortgage lenders are required to compile and make avail-
able to the public certain information about their lending activity. 48
Lenders covered by the HMDA are state and federal financial institu-
tions with home or branch offices within a SMSA which make "feder-
ally related mortgage loans." 49 Institutions with assets of ten million
dollars or less are exempt. 50
The most important difference between the Washington act and the
of the Comptroller of the Currency [1971-1978] EQUAL Opp. HOUSING REP. (P-H)
18,012 & 18,018 (D.D.C. March 22. 1977 & Nov. 28, 1977) (consent decrees entered).
The FDIC has issued final rules, applicable to all banks with deposits insured by the
FDIC, setting forth the requirements of the new data-collection system. 43 Fed. Reg.
11,563-68 (1978) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 338); 43 Fed. Reg. 18,540 (effective
date of FDIC rules delayed to July 3, 1978).
47. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. 1978). The act requires the federal regulatory
agencies, with regard to the financial institutions under their respective jurisdictions, to
assess each institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, in-
cluding low and moderate income neighborhoods, and to take that information into ac-
count in evaluating applications for a charter, deposit insurance, branch authorization.
office relocation, merger, and so on. The regulatory agencies have issued regulations
implementing the act. See 43 Fed. Reg. 47,144 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R Parts 25.
228, 345 & 563e) (final regulations effective Nov. 6. 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,918 (pro-
posed regulations). See generally Dennis, The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977:
Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community," 95 BANKING L.J. 693 (1978).
Other bills were introduced in the 95th Congress which would have expressly prohib-
ited redlining but the bills died without action. H.R. 8451, 8464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (amendments to Equal Credit Opportunity Act); H.R. 8510. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1977).
48. The reports are to be available at the institution's home office and at one branch
within each standard metropolitan statistical area in which the institution has offices. 12
U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) (1976). The term "mortgage loans" here, as in the Washington act,
also includes home improvement loans. id. § 2802(1).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2) (1976). Pursuant to the HMDA, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System issued implementing regulations. 12 C.F.R. Part 203
(1978) (Regulation C). These regulations define a "federally related" mortgage loan as
(I) one made by an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency or which
is regulated by any agency of the federal government, (2) one made, insured, or assisted
in any way by various federal programs, or (3) one intended to be sold to any of the fed-
eral entities which dominate the secondary mortgage market. Id. § 203.2(d). These cate-
gories include all federal and most state institutions. For an explanation of the second-
ary mortgage, see Earthman, Residential Mortgage Lending: Charting a Course through
the Regulatory Maze, 29 VAND. L. REV. 957, 973-78 (1976).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 2808 (1976). The Washington Mortgage Disclosure Act has a simi-
lar exemption. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.020(3) (Supp. 1977). See note 26 supra.
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federal act lies in the more extensive information which must be dis-
closed under Washington law. The Washington Mortgage Disclosure
Act requires information about mortgage applications, loans made,
loans rejected, loans closed, and foreclosures and defaults occur-
ring.51 But the federal act requires disclosure of only the number and
total dollar amount of mortgage loans originated or purchased in each
census tract or ZIP code area,52 with further itemization according to
types of loans. 53 There are provisions for enforcement and penalties
for violation.54
The federal act also contains a section detailing its relation to state
disclosure laws.55 In the case of state chartered institutions, the
HMDA provides no relief from complying with state law except
where state law is inconsistent with federal law.56 State chartered in-
stitutions can be exempted from complying with the federal law, how-
ever, where the state disclosure requirements are substantially similar
to the HMDA and are adequately enforced.57 The application of this
section in the case of federally chartered financial institutions is dis-
cussed in Part IV.
C. Similar Developments in Other States
The Washington act expressly applies to federal financial
institutions in an area where federal legislation exists. A number of
51. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(l)-(2) (1976).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b) (1976). The Washington act has several additional catego-
ries. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030(2) (Supp. 1977).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 2804 (1976). Each of the various federal financial regulators is to
enforce compliance by the institutions principally under that regulator. Id. § 2804(b).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 2805 (1976) (quoted in part at note 131 infra.)
56. 12 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1976). More stringent state disclosure requirements are
not to be considered inconsistent with regard to state chartered institutions.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (1976). Thus, a state chartered institution will normally
have to comply with only one set of disclosure requirements. Where state requirements
are substantially similar to federal requirements (i.e., as strict or stricter), an exemption
from federal requirements may be secured; otherwise the federal requirements prevail.
Such exemptions have been given. See e.g., [1971-1978] EQUAL OPP. HOUSING REP.
(P-H) Vol. V, Bull. 16, at 16.3 (March 8, 1978) (New Jersey chartered institutions
granted exemption); 43 Fed. Reg. 35, 394 (1978) (Connecticut chartered institutions
granted exemption). Federally chartered institutions, however, cannot be granted an ex-
emption from the HMDA. 12 U.S.C. § 2805(b)(1)-(2) (1976) (explained in H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 94-726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2336 (quoted at note 135 infra)).
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other states58 and cities59 also have adopted various anti-redlining
measures. In at least three of those states, just as in Washington, 60 the
applicability of the state anti-redlining laws to federally chartered fi-
nancial institutions has been questioned.
In 1975 Illinois enacted an anti-redlining law which applied to fed-
eral financial institutions.61 Application of the state act to federal in-
stitutions was challenged in the Illinois courts, and the act was found
unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. 62 In California, a
federal district court recently held that the state's Housing Financial
Discrimination Act of 197763 could not be applied against federal
58. In addition to Illinois, California, and New Jersey, see notes 61-66 and accom-
panying text infra, Connecticut, Michigan. New York, and Ohio, among others, also
have anti-redlining measures. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Pub. Act No. 77-153 (App. 1978)
(West) (not yet codified); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1601-.1614 (MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
23.1125 (Callaghan Supp. 1978)) (effective July 1, 1978); 3 N.Y. CODES, RULES, REG-
ULATIONS, Supervisory Procedure G 107 (1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page
Supp. 1977); OHIO AD. CODE ch. 1301: 1-7-01 (banks) & ch. 1301: 2-3 (savings and loan
associations) (1977). See generally Ryan. supra note 1, at 77-81. New York also re-
quires lenders who deny mortgage loans or approve them on terms substantially differ-
ent from the norm to notify the applicant in writing of the reasons for the decision. N.Y.
BANKING LAW §6-d (McKinney Supp. 1977). The New York legislature recently passed
a bill specifically outlawing geographic discrimination in mortgage lending. Wall St. J.,
Dec. II, 1978, at 40, col. 4.
59. Chicago and Cleveland ordinances are discussed in Ryan, supra note I, at 82-
83. City ordinances typically require anti-redlining pledges and disclosure from institu-
tions seeking city government contracts or deposits. See Note, Redlining-The Fight
Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. CHI. LJ. 71. 78-79 (1975). Illi-
nois law also includes such a pledge requirement. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 130, § 4 la (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1978).
60. Washington Say. League v. Chapman. No. C 78-163S (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17.
1979) (order granting motions for summary judgment and preliminary injunction). See
note 16 supra.
61. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, §§ 201-208 (mortgage disclosure provisions) & §§ 301-
307 (fairness in lending provisions) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). Illinois has two other
anti-redlining laws. One requires a pledge of no redlining in order to get state deposits.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 130, § 41a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). The other forbids redlining in
homeowners' insurance. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.22 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1978).
62. Glen Ellyn Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 Il1. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1, 4
(1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3 11 (1978). The Illinois court held that the federal Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act preempted the state law in the area of mortgage disclosure
from federal institutions and that, because of a nonseverability, "self-destruct" clause in
the Illinois act, the entire Illinois statute was invalid.
63. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35833 (West Supp. 1978). This act is a
comprehensive treatment of discrimination in housing and housing finance, not merely
an anti-redlining law. Id. §§ 35810 (prohibiting discrimination based on geographic lo-
cation of home), 35811 (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
marital status, national origin, or ancestry), 35812 (racial, ethnic, religious, or national
origin composition of neighborhood not to be factor in appraisal or financing). 35815
(implementing agency authorized to monitor and investigate lending patterns for
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savings and loan associations. 64 New Jersey's anti-redlining law also
purports to apply to federally chartered financial institutions.65 The
General Counsel's Office of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is-
sued an opinion letter stating that the state law is inapplicable to fed-
eral savings and loan associations in New Jersey because of federal
preemption. 66
The attempts by several state legislatures, including Washington's,
to make their anti-redlining laws applicable to federal financial insti-
tutions, despite the consistent position of federal agencies that such
state laws have been preempted, bespeak a need for clearer under-
standing of the bounds of state regulation of national banks and fed-
eral savings and loan associations.
compliance). The act applies to any financial institution in the state. Id. § 35805(c). Ear-
lier administrative regulations were apparently limited to state chartered savings and
loan associations. 10 CAL. AD. CODE §§ 245 (prohibiting discrimination based on neigh-
borhood characteristics unrelated to sound business practices), 242 (general disclosure
requirements), 242.2(u) (use of disclosed data to monitor discrimination prohibition)
(1976).
64. Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Silberman, [1971-1978] EQUAL OPP.
HOUSING REP. (P-H) 1 15,264 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1978). The court held that the
FHLBB's exercise of its plenary regulatory power over federal savings and loan associ-
ations preempts the state anti-redlining legislation and that the plenary regulatory
power of the FHLBB is not limited by the provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691 f (1976), or the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 2801-2809 (1976). Since the court refers neither to the anti-redlining regulations of
the FHLBB nor to any action of the FHLBB other than its opinion that the California
act was not applicable to federal savings and loan associations, the basis of the court's
decision may be that the FHLBB has exclusive power over federal associations and that
the state can regulate federal savings and loan associations only if the FHLBB consents.
Cf. notes 81, 85 & 116-125 and accompanying text infra. The court does not explain
why the apparently contrary preemption provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (1976) (state laws giving greater protection are not
to be displaced by federal law), are not relevant, at least for matters directly within the
scope of the ECOA. Of course, the FHLBB's promulgation of nondiscrimination regula-
tions and express statement of preemptive intent with regard to those rules, see note 46
supra, would preempt state laws in the areas dealt with by the regulations. See notes 74-
86, 120-21 & 124-25 and accompanying text infra. But the Silberman court's decision
does not appear based on those specific regulations. See 44 LEGAL BULL. 287 (1978).
65. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17: 16F (West Supp. 1978). The definition of covered finan-
cial institutions in the redlining law, id. § 17:16F-2a, incorporates by reference defini-
tions in the Banking Law of New Jersey which include national banks and federal
savings and loan associations. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-1(2) & 17:12B-5(3) (West
Supp. 1978).
66. The FHLBB supervises federal savings and loan associations. The March 21,
1977, opinion letter is reprinted in full in 43 LEGAL BULL. 140-45 (May 1977). This
opinion is substantially similar to that received by the Washington Savings League re-
garding the applicability of the Washington act to federal associations. See note 16 su-
pra.
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III. STATE REGULATION OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Because the federally chartered financial institutions principally in-
volved in home mortgage lending are national banks and federal sav-
ings and loan associations, 67 this comment is limited to considering
state regulation of those institutions. 68
A. National Banks
The Supreme Court has observed that "[b] anking is one of the long-
est regulated and most closely supervised of public callings."6 9 In the
United States banks are regulated by the state and federal govern-
ments. This "dual banking system" has developed since the passage of
the National Banking Acts during the Civil War.70 Banks are char-
tered by either the federal government or the various states. 71 In the-
ory, the federal government could entirely preempt the regulation of
67. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 530-31 (98th ed. 1977) (tables 851 & 853); SECTION OF CORPORA-
TION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, ABA, HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW 5 (1973)
(savings and loan associations are nation's largest real estate lenders). There are other
federally chartered financial institutions. E.g.. 12 U.S.C. ch. 14 (1976) (federal credit
unions).
68. The discussion of state regulation is not exhaustive. For example, it omits those
areas in which Congress has specifically incorporated state law into federal law as the
standard for federally chartered institutions. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c) (branch bank-
ing), 85 (interest rates), 92a (trust powers) (1976). These areas, especially branch bank-
ing and interest rates, generate a large number of cases, but they are not treated in this
comment because of the absence of an incorporation of state law in the area of mort-
gage discrimination or redlining. For general discussions of the dual banking system.
see Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, (parts I & 2), 52 VA. L. REV. 565. 771
(1966); Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977); Symposium-Banking Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
635 (1966).
69. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947). Federal savings and loan associa-
tions have been described as regulated "from [their] cradle to [their] corporate grave."
California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
70. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (repealed by 1864 Act); Act ofJune 3,
1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (current version in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., principally
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-221 (1976)). The continuance of the dual banking system was unin-
tended. The sponsors of the national system expected that state banks would cease to ex-
ist and that the national system (centrally and uniformly regulated) would take its place.
See, e.g., W. O'CONNER, THE LAW OF NATIONAL BANKING 26 (1941); Hackley, supra note
68, at 571-73; Scott, supra note 68, at 9. Such an intention on the part of the framers of
the national banking system makes more plausible the argument that national banks
should be governed exclusively by federal regulation.
71. Banks chartered by the federal government are organized under the national
banking laws and subject to regulation by the federal banking agencies. Banks chartered
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national banks either by detailed congressional legislation or by the
development of a federal common law in the courts.72 The actual
course of development, however, has left much regulation to state
law. The test, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Anderson Na-
tional Bank v. Luckett, is that "national banks are subject to state
laws unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or impose an
undue burden on the performance of the banks' functions. '73
As Anderson indicates, the traditional understanding is that limita-
tions on state regulation of national banks derive from two sources.
One source is the preemption of state law-making power by federal
legislation governing national banks. Under the preemption doctrine,
federal law overrides any state law which conflicts with federal law or
infringes upon an area covered by federal law. The other source is the
status of national banks as instrumentalities of the federal government
insofar as they are used to perform certain governmental functions.
1. The basic test: preemption rationale
The test under the preemption rationale turns upon whether a state
law conflicts with or is precluded by federal law. This may occur in a
variety of situations. A state law will be held invalid: (1) where Con-
gress has acted in a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude state laws on the
same subject;74 (2) where a scheme of federal regulation is so perva-
sive as to imply that Congress left no room for state regulation;75 (3)
where state law produces a result inconsistent with the objectives of
federal law;7 6 or (4) where state law actually conflicts with federal
law.77 The preemption rationale thus depends on the existence of a
by a state are organized under that state's laws and subject to regulation principally by
state banking authorities. State banks are subject to a certain measure of federal regula-
tion if they are member banks of the Federal Reserve System, as some are, or if they in-
sure their deposits through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as most do. See
Scott, supra note 68, at 3-7. See generally Hackley, supra note 68; Wille, State Bank-
ing: A Study in Dual Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 733 (1966).
72. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
73. 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944). Similar language was used shortly after the inception
of the national banking system. See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
353, 362 (1869).
74. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
75. Id. These first two formulae comprise the so-called "occupation of the field" or
preclusion variety of preemption.
76. Id.
77. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)
(dictum). The latter two formulae are the conflict or supersession variety of preemption.
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particular federal statute, the scope of that statute, and congressional
intent regarding the statute. When a particular state statute concerns a
subject matter intended by Congress to be within exclusive federal au-
thority, the preclusion variety of preemption is involved. When a state
statute conflicts with a federal law, preemption by supersession is in-
volved. Specific language of regulatory statutes narrows a court's dis-
cretion, and predictability of result is thus enhanced.
Congressional intent is thus crucial in a finding of preemption.78
Only recently, however, has Congress begun to state expressly its in-
tention with regard to the effect of specific statutes on state laws.79
The basic federal banking laws, generally from the nineteenth cen-
tury,80 are silent on preemption. The modern position is to presume
that, absent express language to the contrary, congressional action in
a field is not intended to preempt state law-making power so long as
the latter is not inconsistent with federal law. 81
The Supreme Court's national banking opinions do not adequately
develop the preemption rationale in the bank regulation context.
See generally Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1978) (survey of the
preemption doctrine).
78. The question of congressional purpose is twofold: first, what Congress intended
to accomplish by the law (its scope and objectives); and, second, whether and to what ex-
tent Congress intended the law to prevent state regulation in the area.
79. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 169 1d(f) (1976) (see note
132 infra); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2805 (1976) (see note 131 in-
fra).
80. See note 70 supra.
81. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351. 357 (1976) (clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to oust state power completely, "including state power to promulgate laws not
in conflict with federal laws," must be demonstrated); New York Dep't of Social Serv-
ices v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405. 413- 14 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (federal regulation not to be deemed preemptive of
state regulatory power unless the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion or Congress has unmistakably so ordained). See generally Morris. Constitu-
tional Preemption of State Laws against Massive Oil Spills, I U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
73, 83-97 (1977); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). See also Hirsch, Toward a New
View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 (survey of federal preemption doc-
trine prior to most recent Court developments).
The opposite presumption, namely, that congressional action in a field is intended to
be preemptive in the absence of saving language, has sometimes been advanced. Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson. 315
U.S. 148 (1942). See Morris. supra at 89-91 (discussing cases of the 1940's- 1960's).
The FHLBB's view of the scope of its authority over federal saving and loan associa-
tions and of the inability of the states to regulate federally chartered associations in any
manner seems to be founded upon the latter presumption. See note 85 infra. See also
note 64 supra and notes 116- 125 and accompanying text infra (cases adopting view
similar to FHLBB's).
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Even in relatively recent cases, the Court has limited its discussion to
the particular facts and statutes involved and refrained from dealing
with preemption in general.82 The banking cases do, however, estab-
lish certain minimal propositions. Where state law actually conflicts
with federal banking law, federal law prevails.83 Similarly, a state law
may not be applied to a national bank when federal regulation of a
particular banking area is so extensive that it may be inferred that the
federal law is intended to be exclusive in that area.84
Absent a clear expression of congressional intent, however, the ex-
tent of preemption is uncertain. Although the national character of
federally chartered financial institutions creates a context in which
joint regulation may be less appropriate, 85 the modern trend of the
82. See, e.g., First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 U.S. 339
(1968) (state sales and use tax not applicable to purchases by national bank); Franklin
Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321
U.S. 233 (1944) (state escheat law validly applicable to abandoned deposits in national
bank).
83. Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283-84 (1896). The Davis Court held
that a federal law mandating that creditors of insolvent national banks be paid ratably
out of assets conflicts with and therefore supersedes state law giving preference to state
savings banks with deposits in insolvent banks. The cofiflict between federal and state
law may be indirect or implied as well as direct. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347
U.S. 373 (1954). At issue in Franklin was whether a New York law which allowed only
state chartered mutual savings banks to use the words "saving" or "savings" in advertis-
ing. National banks, as well as state commercial banks, were purportedly prohibited
from using these words in their advertisements. The national banking laws empower na-
tional banks to accept savings deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1976). They also au-
thorize the use of "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of banking." Id. The Court held that implied in the power to accept deposits is the
incidental power to tell the public of that fact, i.e., to advertise it. 347 U.S. at 376, 377-
78. Therefore the restriction in the New York law conflicted with a power granted by
Congress, and federal law prevailed. Id. at 378-79.
84. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220. 231-32, 237 (1903). There, Congress had dealt
directly with the insolvency of national banks with a comprehensive scheme, and the
policies expressed in the federal scheme could not be overridden or supplemented by
state law.
85. See notes 92 & 116-24 and accompanying text infra. The language in some na-
tional bank cases, if taken at face value, might be taken to indicate a lesser role for state
regulation.
The National Bank Act has been described as "constituting by itself a complete sys-
tem for. . . national banks." Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445,
448 (1882). Since national banks are created by the central government as a means to
achieve certain federal ends, "the States can exercise no control over them, nor in any
wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit."
Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875). The theme is that
federal legislation on national banks "has in view the erection of a system extending
throughout the country, and independent, so far as the powers conferred are concerned,
of state legislation, which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and
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preemption doctrine has been toward joint regulation. 86
2. The basic test: instrumentality rationale
The instrumentality rationale was first developed in the landmark
case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which involved the Second Bank of
the United States. 87 After holding that Congress had the power to
charter a bank as a necessary and proper means to carry out expressly
authorized constitutional powers, 88 Chief Justice Marshall declared
that "the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the con-
restrictions as various and numerous as the States." Easton v. Iowa. 188 U.S. 220. 229
(1903).
If a uniform system were the overriding concern of federal legislation, however, then
exceptions permitting the application of state law should be held to a minimum and
should be traceable directly to some specific congressional authorization. The scope of
allowable state regulation would be restricted to those areas where Congress has clearly
so indicated. The paradigm case is congressional incorporation of state law into federal
law. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c) (branch banking). 85 (interest rates), 92a (trust powers)
(1976). But the Court has not adopted such a standard. It has instead left many areas to
the states. E.g., National Bank v. Commonwealth. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869) (na-
tional banks "are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their ... business
far more by the laws of the State than of the nation"). Accordingly. a state law cannot be
invalidated merely by invoking the concept of an uniform national banking system.
since that concept is not unqualified.
The FHLBB has nevertheless asserted such a theory for federal savings and loan asso-
ciations. The FHLBB maintains that federal savings and loan associations are exclu-
sively regulated by federal authority (the FHLBB) and that state laws are effective
against federal associations only if federal law expressly incorporates them. Opinion
Letter of Daniel Goldberg, Acting General Counsel. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(March 21. 1977). reprinted in 43 LEGAL BULL. 140. 141 (May 1977) (regarding New
Jersey's mortgage disclosure law); Opinion Letter from Daniel Goldberg, Acting Gen-
eral Counsel of the FHLBB, to Robert L. Shults, President, Washington Savings
League, at 2 (July 22, 1977) (copy on file with Washington Law Review); Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at 10, Glen Ellyn Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Tsoumas, 71 111. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 311 (1978). But
see note 64 supra & notes 116-24 and accompanying text infra.
86. See note 81 and accompanying text supra. See also Morris. supra note 81. at
91-97.
87. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The state act in McCulloch amounted to a direct
challenge of the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland attempted to levy a tax on
the Bank's notes without levying the tax on the notes of state chartered banks. The Sec-
ond Bank of the United States was clearly a federal instrumentality. The federal govern-
ment owned twenty percent of its stock and appointed twenty percent of its directors;
the Bank was the only congressionally chartered bank during its life; it acted as the de-
pository for government funds and as the government's fiscal agent. Act of April 10.
1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266. See also P. STUDENSKI & H. KRooss, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 83-88 (Ist ed. 1952).
88. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407- 12.
356
Anti-Redlining Act
stitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the pow-
ers vested in the general government." 89
Although national banks differ significantly from the Second Bank
of the United States,90 the Court early held that national banks had
federal instrumentality status91 because under the National Banking
Acts they were still to be used to accomplish certain governmental ob-
jectives.92 Because the banks are private in character and serve only a
limited government function, their protection from state regulation is
commensurately limited: they are exempted from state legislation only
so far as the legislation interferes with or impairs the banks' perform-
ance of the functions which the federal government requires of
them.:1 3
The Supreme Court has failed to clarify, however, when a state law
so interferes with the performance of a federal function that it cannot
89. Id. at 436. See also id. at 432-33.
90. Unlike the Second Bank of the United States, modern national banks are nu-
merous and completely privately owned and operated. See also note 92 infra.
91. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1875); Na-
tional Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361 (1869).
92. The primary government functions the national banks were meant to serve in-
cluded issuing circulating bank notes (based on government bonds) in order to provide
a reliable and uniform currency, acting as depositories for public funds, and acting as
the government's fiscal agent. W. O'CONNOR, supra note 70, at 26; P. STUDENSKI & H.
KROOSS, supra note 87, at 154-55, 178-79. The most important of these was issuance of
the bank notes intended to serve as the national currency. The national banking system
served these roles from its creation during the Civil War until the establishment of the
Federal Reserve System in 1913. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 251 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. ch. 3 (1976)). The development of the Federal Reserve has
drastically changed the relationship between national banks and the federal govern-
ment. National banks no longer issue currency. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note
87, at 393. The Federal Reserve Banks now hold the government's principal accounts
and act as the government's fiscal agents. Thus, national banks no longer serve their tra-
ditional quasi-governmental roles. Some argue that, therefore, national banks should no
longer have federal instrumentality status. See notes 96-97 infra.
National banks do, however, perform several indirect functions, principally imple-
mentation of monetary policy. National banks are required to become members of the
Federal Reserve System; state banks may join voluntarily. The Federal Reserve Board
controls money supply by operations to alter the reserve levels of member banks. P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 318-22 (9th ed. 1973). These functions do not seem compara-
ble to the former functions of national banks for purposes of conferring federal instru-
mentality status. If a role in monetary policy makes national banks federal instruments,
then state member banks should similarly qualify. But see Schwind & O'Leary, Are Na-
tional Banks Federal Instrumentalities Today?, 86 BANKING LJ. 99, 102-103 (1969)
(discussing other lesser federal policies in which national banks have some part and ar-
guing that these are adequate to confer instrumentality status).
93. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1869). This case first
laid down the principle that national banks, in the greater part of their dealings, would
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constitutionally be applied to national banks. : 4 Such lack of guidance
be subject to state laws.
[National banks] are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their
daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All
their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and
transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued
for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the
banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitu-
tional.
Id. at 362.
94. Although the federal instrumentality formula is often repeated, see, e.g.. Ander-
son Nat'l Bank v. Luckett. 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944): McClellan v. Chipman. 164 U.S.
347. 356-57 (1896), it appears that the preemption rationale has been the true ground of
decision. The instrumentality doctrine was used as the basis of decision only in the cases
involving state taxation of the Second Bank of the United States, McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Osborn v. United States Bank. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824). The Bank's clear status as a federal agent, the absence of federal legislation
on point, and the unabashedly discriminatory nature of the state tax, however, made the
outcome clear and distinguishes those cases from present ones.
The first case to discuss the extent of permissible state regulation of national banks
involved a specific banking statute. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
353 (1869), construing Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. I ll (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)). The Court held that a Kentucky tax on bank shares was per-
mitted under federal law, even though the tax was initially payable by the bank's cash-
ier, because ultimately the tax was on the shareholder, not on an activity of the bank, the
bank being used merely as a collection device. In Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v.
Dearing. 91 U.S. 29 (1875), the Court held federal law controlled in a conflict with a
New York statute regarding the penalty for usurious interest. Id. at 35-36.
A New York statute giving state savings banks which had deposited money in a state
or national commercial bank a preference on the insolvency of the depository bank was
challenged as to national banks in Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank. 161 U.S. 275 (1896), as
conflicting with the Act of June 3. 1864, ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 194 (1976)). The federal law required that creditors of insolvent national
banks be paid ratably without preferences. The Court found a direct conflict between
the two banking laws and declared the state law invalid. 161 U.S. at 283-84. On the
other hand, a Massachusetts law which voided transfers of property in contemplation of
bankruptcy for the purpose of creating a preference was upheld in McClellan v. Chip-
man, 164 U.S. 347 (1896). It was argued that this infringed the national bank's federally
granted powers to make loans and to hold property conveyed as security for previous
debts under the Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106. §§ 8, 9 (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,
29 (1976)). The Court found no conflict. 164 U.S. at 358. See also note 103 and accom-
panying text infra.
In cases involving state escheat laws, the Court's discussion focused not on impair-
ment in attaining the goals of the national banking system, but on whether the escheat
law infringed the bank's statutory powers. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett. 321 U.S.
233 (1944) (state escheat law is applicable); First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366
(1923) (state escheat law not applicable to national banks). See note 103 and accompa-
nying text infra. The issue was whether the escheat of deposits to the state was inconsis-
tent with a broadly described power to receive deposits, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(1976), and duty to repay them. See First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. at 369-70.
Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954) (discussed at note 83 supra).
and Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903) (discussed at note 84 supra), were similarly de-
cided on preemption, not instrumentality, grounds.
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gives the instrumentality rationale an indeterminate scope, resting on
judicial conclusions about what is necessary to achieve the goals of
the national banking system and what constitutes an undue burden or
causes unacceptable inefficiency.9 5 Moreover, some courts93 6 and
commentators9 7 have argued that national banks are no longer federal
instrumentalities and should not be immune from state laws on that
ground.9 8 Since the instrumentality rationale is no longer clearly sup-
95. Scott, supra note 68, at 17- 18. The importance of the instrumentality rationale
may well lie in its potential ability to protect national banks from state interference in
the absence of a specific federal statute.
96. In cases involving the application of state sales and use taxes to purchases by
national banks, the highest courts of Massachusetts and New York held that the taxes
could be validly applied. The courts reasoned that national banks were no longer fed-
eral instrumentalities and thus were without immunity from state taxes on that basis
and that the federal statute on state taxing power was silent on the point, and so did not
preempt state law. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 N.E.2d 245
(Mass. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia,
21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
929 (1968), rev'd, 23 N.Y. 2d 933, 246 N.E.2d 361, 298 N.Y.S.2d 513 (on reargument
after the Supreme Court's decision in First Agricultural), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941
(1969).
The United States Supreme Court reversed First Agricultural but expressly chose not
to address the federal instrumentality question. First Agricultural Natl Bank v. State
Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 341 (1968). See generally Note, State Taxation of National
Banks: Federal Inmunity of National Banks Survives Transformation of Banks' Func-
tions, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 352. The Court in the 5-3 decision held that the federal statute
on state taxation of national banks in effect at that time, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964)
(amended 1969) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)), was exhaustive in its listing
of the ways a state could tax national banks. Sales and use taxes were not mentioned.
The dissenters argued both a different interpretation of the statute and that national
banks are no longer federal instrumentalities. The dissenters further suggested that the
protection of national banks from state regulation was better done by Congress or, if by
the Court, then only to provide protection from discriminatory state laws. First Agricul-
tural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. at 349-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Congress responded to First Agricultural by amending 12 U.S.C. § 548 so that states
may tax national banks in whatever ways state banks in the state are taxed. Act of Dec.
24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
97. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111 & 384-85 (9th ed. 1975);
Note, Constitutional Law-State-Federal Relations-State Sales and Use Taxes Can
Be Levied on National Banks, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1576 (1968). But see Schwind &
O'Leary, supra note 92.
98. Underlying the criticism of the federal instrumentality rationale is, perhaps, a
recognition of the vast change in the amount of federal statutes and regulations govern-
ing national banks. In the nineteenth century there was a relatively small amount of fed-
eral legislation; accordingly, there was at least more potential need for a federal instru-
mentality rationale to protect national banks. Today there is an ever increasing
quantity of federal legislation, rules, and regulations, and a better machinery (the regu-
latory agencies) to make detailed provisions. Therefore, there is less need for the instru-
mentality rationale as the preemption rationale becomes more applicable.
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ported by the case holdings9 9 and its theoretical basis is open to seri-
ous question,100 it is preferable to analyze state regulation of federal
financial institutions predominantly in terms of preemption.
3. Other themes
In addition to the foregoing basic principles, the Supreme Court
has developed several subordinate themes in conjunction with the bas-
ic test. t0 ' These themes include: (1) a distinction between general and
specific state laws, (2) a distinction between discriminatory and non-
discriminatory state laws, and (3) the doctrine of competitive equality
between national banks and state banks.
The Court has distinguished state laws of general application
incidentally affecting banks from state laws specifically regulating
banking. The former are more likely than the latter to be constitution-
ally applicable to national banks. 02 This distinction is based on the
assumption that a general state law usually will involve some area tra-
ditionally subject to state power and that the incidental effect upon a
national bank in one instance does not derogate the state's power over
that area.' 03
99. See note 94 supra.
100. See note 92 supra.
101. Although the Court has frequently reiterated the basic test, it has done so with
little discussion or elaboration. See, e.g., Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275. 283
(1896) (the basic principles are "axiomatic").
102. Cf. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 239 (1903) (distinguishing general criminal
laws of state applicable to all persons within jurisdiction from special laws making
criminal certain acts committed by banking officers).
103. Easy examples are building and safety codes. Loosely speaking, in such in-
stances the state is not asserting a power over the bank qua bank. For example, in An-
derson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944), the issue was the power of a state to
escheat presumptively abandoned deposits in national banks within the state. The bank
argued that this infringed the bank's power to accept deposits under the Act of June 3.
1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 101 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1976)). The
Court viewed bank accounts as part of the property within a state traditionally subject
to state control of transfer and devolution. 321 U.S. at 248. The state statute regulated
the devolution of property and was not an assertion of power by the state over national
bank deposits. The statute devolved the account to the state, and then the state as deposi-
tor demanded payment from the bank. Id. at 248-49. Application of the law to national
banks was therefore upheld. Anderson was followed in Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S. 226,
230 (1949) (escheat of unclaimed dividends), and in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey.
341 U.S. 428 (1951). But see First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923) (simi-
lar law of escheat of abandoned deposits held invalid). The Anderson Court distin-
guished First Nat'l Bank v. California by differences in terms of the statutes.
Subjecting national banks to a Massachusetts statute restricting real estate transfers
was challenged on the grounds that it impaired the banks' statutory powers to make
loans and to secure previous debts with real property. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S.
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The Court has also noted a distinction between state laws which are
discriminatory, applying only to national banks, and those which are
nondiscriminatory, applying to both state and national banks. 104 The
fact that a state law is applied to state as well as national banks sup-
ports the validity of the law. 05 State statutes which apply only to na-
tional banks are unlikely to be concerned with the regulation of banks
for the public welfare since state banks are not required to comply.
Rather, their purpose frequently is to hamper the operations of na-
tional banks and perhaps keep them out of the state. 106 McCulloch v.
Maryland involved such a discriminatory statute, and the Court
promptly struck it down. 107
Recently the Court has emphasized the policy of competitive equal-
ity between national banks and state banks.108 The powers and re-
347 (1896). The Massachusetts statute rendered void a conveyance or pledge of prop-
erty made by a person insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency to a creditor within
six months before filing a petition in bankruptcy, if the transferee creditor knew of the
impending insolvency and if the purpose of the transfer was to give the creditor a prefer-
ence. In McClellan a creditor national bank had so received property. The Court upheld
the state statute, finding no conflict with federal law and no impairment of bank effi-
ciency. Id. at 358, 361. Central to the Court's reasoning was that most contracts and
dealings of national banks are governed by general state laws and that the statute under
challenge subjected national banks to the same conditions regarding real estate transfers
as other citizens of the state. Id. at 357-58, 361. Cf. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161
U.S. 275, 290 (1896) (New York law which was found invalid as conflicting with federal
law specifically concerned banks, see note 94 supra).
104. See, e.g., Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 227 (1903). The Iowa statute made it a
criminal offense for a bank officer to accept deposits, knowing the bank was insolvent.
See note 84 supra. The Iowa law was, in fact, nondiscriminatory, 188 U.S. at 227, but
was found invalid on preemption grounds. The discriminatory application distinction
and the generallspecific distinction are often discussed together. See, e.g., David v. El-
mira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 290 (1896); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 360-
61(1896).
105. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 247 (1944) (that state
escheat law did not discriminate against national banks but required both state and na-
tional banks to pay escheated accounts to state contributed to validity of state law).
106. Such action by a state would arguably be in conflict with federal law authoriz-
ing national banks to exist and do a banking business. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 24 (1976).
107. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 319. See note 87 supra. Note that the Maryland law
would have undermined the competitive position of the Second Bank of the United
States and was both clearly discriminatory and directed against the bank's operation as
a bank.
108. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131-32 (1969), rehearing denied,
396 U.S. 1047 (1970) (branching); First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385
U.S. 252, 257-61 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967) (branching). See also
Dakota Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 554 F.2d 345, 353-55
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 548 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Inde-
pendent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
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strictions of national banks and state banks should be such that nei-
ther is at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace of an
individual state.' 09 The policy of competitive equality originated as a
basis for the branching provisions of federal banking law which give
national banks the same power to establish branches as state banks
enjoy.110 The courts have indicated some willingness to extend the
principle beyond the area of branching."' Extension is reasonable
where, as in branching, Congress has expressly incorporated state law
into the national banking laws, ' 2 since the purpose of such incorpo-
ration is to achieve intrastate uniformity in the regulation of national
and state banks in the areas covered.' 13
862 (1976). But see Scott. supra note 68, at 41-42 (criticism of competitive equality as
a misconception even in branch banking in which the doctrine was first developed).
109. Cf. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York. 347 U.S. 373, 375 (1954) (Congress ex-
panded powers of national banks to keep them from being at a disadvantage against
state chartered banks).
110. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966). rehearing
denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1967) (construing 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)). The federal statute pro-
vides that national banks may establish and operate new branches if the law of the state
where the national bank is sited authorizes state banks to do so. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976).
In Walker Bank the issue was the extent to which state branching law was incorporated
into federal law. Utah allowed branching but only by means of taking over an existing
operation of another bank. From the legislative history of the branching provisions, the
Court found that Congress, in order to place national banks and state banks on an equal
competitive basis, intended that national banks be able to branch to the same extent as
state banks in the location state were. 385 U.S. at 257-61.
The final result in the branching cases has been that state law is incorporated in deter-
mining whether, where, when, and how branching is allowed for national banks, but the
question of what constitutes a branch is a matter for federal common law under 12
U.S.C. § 36(f). First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122. 130, 133-34 (1969). rehear-
ing denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1970); Walker Bank, 385 U.S. at 261-62.
1I1. "The policy of competitive equality is therefore firmly embedded in the stat-
utes governing the national banking system." First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S.
122, 133 (1969). rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 1047 (1970) (dictum). Similar broad dictum
appeared in Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The Eighth Circuit has extended competitive equality be-
yond branching. St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co.. 548 F.2d 716.
720 (1976). cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977) (trust powers under 12 U.S.C. § 92a
(1976)). However, some would restrict the principle of competitive equality to branch
banking. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson. 396 U.S. 122, 139 (1969). rehearing denied, 396
U.S. 1047 (1970) (Douglas. J., dissenting) (quoting Walker Bank and emphasizing that
application in that case was limited to branch banking).
112. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Eighth) (charitable contributions), 85 (interest rates), 90
(security for deposits of state funds), 92a (trust powers) (1976).
113. See notes 109- 10 and accompanying text supra. See also Scott, supra note 68.
at 37.
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B. Federal Savings and Loan Associations
There is less authority concerning state regulation of federal sav-
ings and loan associations than state regulation of national banks.1 14
Federal savings and loan associations, like national banks, have been
declared to be federal instrumentalities1 15 but are distinguished from
national banks with regard to the scope of the states' authority to re-
gulate them. 116
Lower federal court opinions occasionally assert that, because
Congress has delegated authority to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) to make all necessary rules to govern federal savings
and loan associations, 117 the regulation of federal associations has
been federalized completely, leaving no room for state control.1 8 But
this argument is neither carefully considered nor, in this broad form,
required by the cases in which it appears. Those cases have involved
internal operational affairs of federal savings and loan associations, 1 9
114. There are, for instance, no Supreme Court cases. Of course the limits of state
regulation of national banks, while more articulated than those of federal savings and
loan associations, are also inadequately developed. Federal savings and loan associa-
tions are thrift institutions organized under the Federal Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933, 12 U.S.C. ch. 12 (1976).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 241 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1957); Durnin v.
Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Federal sav-
ings and loan associations, however, are federal instrumentalities only to a limited ex-
tent. Gibson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
116. E.g., Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 377 F.
Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. 111. 1974). "As to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field
for state regulation and the application of state laws [citing no authority]; but as to fed-
eral savings and loan associations, Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation to
the Board to organize, incorporate, supervise and regulate, leaving no field for state su-
pervision." California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal.
1951). The Coast Federal court gives no authority for this statement. The "plenary,
preemptive delegation" in the case of federal savings and loan associations is inferred
from 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976) (quoted at note 117 infra). This interpretation is con-
trary to the modern view that joint regulation is presumed unless Congress expressly
states its preemptive intent. See note 81 supra and notes 121 & 124-25 and accompany-
ing text infra.
117. "[T he Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may pre-
scribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and reg-
ulation of associations to be known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations..
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
118. E.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.
1974); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D.
III. 1975); Elwert v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 395, 399-400
(D. Ore. 1956); California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 318 (S.D.
Cal. 1951).
119. Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823,
826 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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actual conflict between state law and an existent federal law or
FHLBB regulation, 120 or preemption of a particular area by a federal
regulatory scheme. 121
There is, moreover, no basis in policy for federal savings and loan
associations to be any more federalized than national banks. Indeed,
if performance of a central government function is the raison d'tre
for uniform federal regulation and curtailment of state power, then
national banks should be more federalized than federal savings and
loan associations because of the banks' role in regulating money sup-
ply.' 22 But it has long been established that national banks can be
subject to state laws in appropriate circumstances. 23 The sounder po-
sition, therefore, is that the complete preclusive federalization of the
regulation of federal savings and loan associations extends to the in-
ternal affairs of the associations, but that for external transactions, in-
cluding nondiscrimination regulation, state law may apply to federal
associations unless expressly preempted by federal laws or
regulations. 2 4 Thus, the test for determining which state laws can be
applied to federal associations is the same basic test used for national
banks, allowing for differences between the federal laws governing
120. E.g., California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal.
1951).
121. E.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145. 1146-47
(9th Cir. 1974) (preemption of field of prepayment of real estate loans to federally char-
tered savings and loan associations).
The "total federalization" view is contrary to the current presumption in the preemp-
tion doctrine that state laws in an area are to be upheld unless congressional intent to
preempt is clear. See notes 64, 81 & 85 and accompanying text supra. Moreover. even if
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) did evidence some general congressional preemptive intent, for
areas covered by specific enactments such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1691 (1976), the specific form of preemption Congress expressed for that area
may arguably control. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's preemption provision. 15
U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (quoted at note 132 infra), is not in accord with the total federaliza-
tion theory. Also, the total federalization theory has no obvious, inherent limitation.
Under it, state and local building codes and even local zoning would apparently be in-
applicable to federal savings and loan associations, unless the FHLBB consents to these
local regulations.
122. See note 92 supra.
123. See notes 73-113 and accompanying text supra. In at least one case it has
been recognized that FHLBB rules do not provide the sole method of regulating federal
savings and loan associations. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, 371 F. Supp. 306, 3 13-14 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (transfer of control of as-
sociation by controlling group in a manner not proscribed by specific FHLBB rule nev-
ertheless held unlawful under federal common law).
124. See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 11.6 at 692-95 (3d ed. 1979); Bartlett, The Federal-State Preemption Conflict,
44 LEGAL BULL. 1, 1- 13 (1978).
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national banks and those governing federal savings and loan associa-
tions. 125
IV. THE VALIDITY OF WASHINGTON'S
ANTI-REDLINING LAW
A. Mortgage Disclosure Provisions
Washington's Mortgage Disclosure Act' 26 does not discriminate
against federally chartered financial institutions in favor of state char-
tered institutions; nor does it put state chartered institutions in a supe-
rior competitive position.' 27 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the mort-
gage disclosure portions of the Washington law can be validly applied
to federally chartered financial institutions. First, Congress has
preempted the mortgage disclosure area. Second, the Washington act
is an unauthorized exercise of visitorial powers by the state.
The HMDA 12 8 which directly addresses the area of mortgage dis-
closure contains a section detailing its relation to state laws. This sec-
tion and its legislative history show Congress' intent to preempt state
law-making power over federal financial institutions in this area. As
finally adopted, the HMDA provides that state mortgage disclosure
laws may continue to apply only to state chartered institutions and
only to the extent those laws are not inconsistent with federal law. t29
125. Cf. Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 n.6
(9th Cir. 1974) (conflict between laws as related to extent of federal preemption). Be-
cause differences exist in federal law regarding national banks and federal savings and
loan associations, it is possible that preemption of state law on a certain topic will be
different for each institution and so the scope of permissible state regulation different.
Further variations may stem from the fact that the governmental functions expected of
the two institutions are different.
126. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.106 (Supp. 1977). See notes 23-30 and accompany-
ing text supra.
127. The HMDA provides for exemption for state chartered institutions but not for
federally chartered institutions. See notes 129- 131 and accompanying text infra. There-
fore, federal institutions would be required to compile two different sets of mortgage
data, leaving aside the preemptive impact of the federal act on the state law, whereas
state institutions need compile only one. The extra cost burden thereby created is proba-
bly not substantial enough to have an adverse impact on an institution's competitive po-
sition. In any event, the adverse impact on competitive equality is not produced by the
terms of the state act.
128. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976). See notes 42-57 and accompanying text su-
pra.
129. Since a state law may not be deemed inconsistent because it requires greater
detail or otherwise requires greater disclosure, 12 U.S.C. § 2805(a) (1976), and an
exemption from the federal act may be given if the state requirements are substantially
similar to federal, id. § 2805(b), only weaker state laws are superseded with respect to
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In such cases the state chartered institutions may be exempted from
reporting under the federal act;' 30 but federally chartered institutions
cannot be exempted from the federal requirements. 31
The original version of the exempting section was intended to in-
clude federally chartered institutions.132 If it had passed, it would
have required federal institutions to comply with appropriate state
disclosure laws.' 33 During floor debate, however, the House amended
state chartered institutions. State laws as stringent or more stringent than the federal re-
quirements continue, and by the exemption federal law is not applied. See notes 56 &
57 supra.
130. See note 57 supra.
13 1. The section of the HMDA concerning its relation to state laws provides, in rel-
evant part. as follows:
(a) This chapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any State chartered
depository institution subject to the provisions of this chapter from complying with
the laws of any State or subdivision thereof with respect to public disclosure and re-
cordkeeping by depositor institutions, except to the extent that those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of this chapter. and then only to the extent of the in-
consistency. The Board is authorized to determine whether such inconsistencies ex-
ist. The Board may not determine that any such law is inconsistent with any provi-
sion of this chapter if the Board determines that such law requires the maintenance
of records with greater geographic or other detail than is required under this
chapter. or that such law otherwise provides greater disclosure than is required un-
der this chapter.
(b) The Board may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this chapter
any State chartered depository institution within any State or subdivision thereof if
it determines that, under the law of such State or subdivision, that institution is sub-
ject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this chapter, and
that such law contains adequate provisions for enforcement.
12 U.S.C. § 2805 (1976).
132. H.R. 10024 § 306, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
94-726, 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. 9. reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2333, 2336. The significant change was that "any person" in the original version was re-
placed with "state chartered institution" in the final, enacted version. The language of
the original version was based on similar provisions for the relation of federal to state
laws in other federal consumer finance laws. For example, the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act provides:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this subchapter. from complying with, the laws of any State with re-
spect to credit discrimination, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent
with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency.... The Board may not determine that any State law is inconsistent
with any provision of this subchapter if the Board determines that such law gives
greater protection to the applicant.
15 U.S.C. § 169d(f) (1976).
133. The earlier House committee explanation stated:
To insure compliance by Federal institutions with stricter state disclosure statutes.
H.R. 10024 makes it clear that Federal institutions must comply with state law and
regulations, even if it should be inconsistent with Federal law by requiring mainte-
nance of records with greater geographic or other detail, or provide for greater dis-
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the exempting section to apply only to state chartered institutions. 134
The conference committee report explaining the two positions and the
reasons behind the House change clearly shows a congressional intent
that federal financial institutions not be subject to state mortgage dis-
closure laws. 135 Thus, by enacting the House version, Congress in-
tended to preempt the states from requiring federally chartered finan-
cial institutions to disclose mortgage lending statistics. 136 Therefore,
closure than is required by Federal law.
H.R. REP. No. 94-561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19. reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2303, 2320-21.
134. Congressman Stephens, speaking for the sponsor of the amendment, explained
the reasons for the change:
[In the present House version] it is not clear whether State regulation will be ad-
hered to or whether Federal regulation will be adhered to... if there is a difference
between the State regulation and the Federal regulation.
[Federal savings and loan associations] have always been regulated by the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board. The Board says it is not clear whether that is to be
continued or not. This is what the Board has asked to be done, and this is ... why I
offered the amendment. I will read from a letter of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, as follows:
We are concerned that section 306 of title III could be construed to require
Federal savings and loan associations to comply with public disclosure and
record-keeping requirements imposed by State law. . . . Although it is not
clear from a reading of section 306 that the section would subject Federal in-
stitutions to State law disclosure requirements, such an inference has been
drawn by language in the House Banking Committee report ...
That was not what was understood from the hearing as the intent of the commit-
tee.
Mr. Chairman, this [amendment] would clarify that. That is all it does.
121 CONG. REc. 34,564 (1975) (printing error in Congressional Record has been cor-
rected).
135. The conference report stated in part:
The Senate's intent was to subject all depository institutions in a jurisdiction to the
same mortgage disclosure law, whether State or Federal, depending on which of-
fered a greater degree of disclosure of mortgage information.
. . . The intent of the House provision is that in the area of public disclosure of
mortgage lending statistics, this Act shall apply to all depository institutions unless
an exemption is granted by the Board, in which case state-chartered institutions
would be subject to the state or local law to the extent of the exemption, but Feder-
ally chartered institutions would continue to follow the requirements of this Act.
The conferees understand that for the purposes of exemption authority granted to
the Board, the term State law shall include State regulations which carry the force
of law.
The Senate conferees regard the House provision concerning Federal pre-emp-
tion as an exception to the pre-emption provisions of other consumer finance laws,
including the Truth in Lending and the Fair Credit Billing Acts, which contain pro-
visions similar to the Senate provisions of S. 1281.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2333, 2336.
136. Id. at 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws at 2336.
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under the preemption rationale of the basic test discussed in Part III,
Washington's mortgage disclosure law appears invalid as applied to
federal institutions. 137
It is a fundamental policy of the dual banking system that the sov-
ereign which charters a financial institution is the authority which su-
pervises and primarily regulates it.138 In keeping with this policy,
Congress has expressly provided that states have no rights of visitation
over national banks except insofar as is vested in state courts. 39 Visi-
torial power is essentially the power to examine the records and look
into the operations of an institution. This prohibition of state visitorial
power has been interpreted to preclude state banking officials from
inspecting or requiring the production of records of national banks. 40
The Washington act requires regular reports to state officials of all
137. The court in Washington Savings League recently held, with regard to federal
savings and loan associations, that the state mortgage disclosure provisions are
preempted by the HMDA. Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment and Per-
manent Injunction at 2-3, Washington Sav. League v. Chapman. No. C 78-163S (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 17. 1979). The preemption rationale is discussed at notes 73-86 and accom-
panying text supra. Since the authority granted by the HMDA will terminate in mid-
1980, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2808-2809 (1976). it will be necessary to reevaluate federal preemp-
tion and the applicability of the Washington act according to federal laws and regula-
tions in effect at that time. The Washington Mortgage Disclosure Act itself will expire
on January I, 1981. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.900 (Supp. 1977).
138. See generally Scott, supra note 68, at 5-6. Traditionally. state authorities su-
pervise state chartered financial institutions; federal authorities supervise federally
chartered ones. Through federal deposit insurance, federal savings and loan insurance.
the federal reserve system, and similar federal programs. the federal government also
exercises some control over most state chartered institutions.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 484 (1976) provides:
No bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers other than such as are author-
ized by law, or vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be or shall have been
exercised or directed by Congress, or by either House thereof or by any committee
of Congress or of either House duly authorized.
Id. See also Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158-59 (1905) (construing prior codifi-
cation of 12 U.S.C. § 484 (1976) and explaining meaning of "'visitorial powers"). The
theoretical foundation for this policy-the sovereignty of the chartering government-
applies equally to federal savings and loan associations. The federalization of the regu-
lation of federal associations under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) extends at least as far as super-
visory and visitorial rights, since actual regulations on these matters exist.
140. An interpretive ruling of the Comptroller's Office provides:
The exercise of visitorial powers over national banks is vested in the Comptroller
of the Currency. See 12 U.S.C. § 484. Other officials, including state banking offi-
cials, have no authority to conduct examinations or to inspect or require the
production of books or records of national banks, except as authorized by law.
12 C.F.R. § 7.6025(b) (1978) (emphasis added). That the Washington law requires the
reports go to the secretary of state rather than the state banking supervisor or savings
and loan supervisor does not change the effect of this regulation. The reporting require-
ment is still a manifestation of supervision. See note 30 supra.
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home mortgage lending operations within metropolitan areas. 141 The
required reporting is not limited to investigation of specific com-
plaints of redlining or specific neighborhoods where redlining is sus-
pected. 142 Thus the reporting goes beyond merely providing a means
of enforcing the Fairness in Lending Act. 143 The reporting require-
ment is an effort to monitor mortgage lending in general for purposes
of gathering information on redlining and disinvestment. Such
oversight of what a bank or savings and loan association is doing
seems to fall under the prohibition against supervision. 44 Thus, the
mortgage disclosure provisions of Washington's Financial Institutions
Disclosure Act should also be declared invalid as an attempt to exer-
cise unconstitutionally broad visitorial and supervisory powers over
federally chartered financial institutions.
B. Fairness in Lending Provisions
The application of the Fairness in Lending Act portion of the
Washington law, 145 which prohibits discrimination in lending based
on the location of the mortgaged house, to federally chartered finan-
cial institutions is, however, more complicated than the application of
the state mortgage disclosure provisions. The result is different for na-
tional banks than for federal savings and loan associations.
The Washington Fairness in Lending Act applies to federally and
state chartered institutions equally. 146 It is a general state law, of
which the primary purpose is to protect the rights of state residents
rather than affect financial institutions. 147 With regard to national
banks, there are as yet no federal laws or regulations in the area. The
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.106.030 (Supp. 1977) (annual reports to the secretary
of state). See note 30 supra.
142. The reports must be made for every neighborhood wholly or partially in a
SMSA. Id. For Washington that is all of King, Snohomish, Pierce, Yakima, Spokane,
and Clark counties. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
143. Requiring reports from national banks to state officials when that is needed to
enforce a valid state law was upheld in Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233,
252-53 (1944). See note 154 infra.
144. See notes 139 & 140 and accompanying text supra.
145. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.04.500-.515 (Supp. 1977). See notes 36-41 and ac-
companying text supra.
146. See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the distinc-
tion between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory state laws.
147. See notes 102 & 103 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the dis-
tinction between specific and general state laws. In this respect the Fairness in Lending
Act is analogous to the state escheat law in Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S.
233 (1944).
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law thus bears none of the indicia which have served to invalidate
state laws regulating national banks in other contexts.
Moreover, the Fairness in Lending Act is not affected by the
HMDA. The federal law deals only with mortgage disclosure, not
with the prohibition of redlining. There was no congressional intent to
preempt state antidiscrimination provisions. The HMDA's preemp-
tion provision is different from those of other federal consumer fi-
nance laws,' 48 and the Senate conferees expressed their understanding
that the unusual preemption provision of the HMDA "goes only to the
narrow area of geographical disclosure of mortgage lending statis-
tics." 1 49 Accordingly, Washington's Fairness in Lending Act is validly
applicable to national banks. ' 50
In the case of federal savings and loan associations, however, the
FHLBB recently has issued specific nondiscrimination regulations
which prohibit redlining and which explicitly state the Board's intent
to preempt regulation of federal associations in this area. 51 Under
148. In general, in antidiscrimination or consumer protection laws in the financial
area, federal laws permit state law to be effective where it is at least as strong as the
federal law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1633. 1666j(a) (Fair Credit Billing Act). 1677,
1681t, 1691d(f) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) (quoted in part at note 132 supra)
(1976).
149. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-726. 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [ 1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2333, 2336. "In the case of mortgage disclosure, how-
ever, the conferees [on] the part of the House strongly believe that subjecting a Feder-
ally chartered institution to state law would threaten the dual banking system." Id. Ar-
guably. the reason that subjecting a federally chartered financial institution to a state
mortgage disclosure law is a threat to the dual banking system, whereas subjecting fed-
eral institutions to state nondiscrimination and consumer finance laws is not a threat, is
the supervisory nature of requiring reports. See notes 132, 135, 138-44 and accompa-
nying text supra.
150. A recent interpretive letter of the Comptroller's Office regarding the applica-
bility of Michigan's anti-redlining law to national banks adopts a similar view.
Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 61 (Sept. I1. 1978). reprinted in [1978] FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,136 (provisions prohibiting redlining discrimination ap-
plicable to national banks, but mortgage disclosure provisions preempted by HMDA).
151. 43 Fed. Reg. 22332-39 (1978) (final amendments to 12 C.F.R. Parts 528 &
531, effective July 1. 1978). See note 46 supra. The Bank Board's express intent to
preempt state law is shown in its statement that "it is the Bank Board's intent that Feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan associations institutions shall be governed solely by
[these federal regulations] ." 43 Fed. Reg. 22333 (1978) (emphasis added). This state-
ment raises two problems: (1) the source of the FHLBB's authority for this preemption
and (2) the effect of these regulations on state chartered institutions.
These regulations are issued pursuant to several statutes. The scope of the FHLBB's
authority and therefore of its power to preempt state law is different for each source.
The regulations implement the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §§
1691- 1691f(1976), the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 45 (1976), the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1976), and the various acts empowering the
FHLBB to regulate the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Savings and Loan In-
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even the most limited modern presumption in the preemption doc-
trine,1 52 a specific regulatory scheme with express preemptive intent
must be held to preclude state regulation of the same area. Therefore,
the Washington Fairness in Lending Act should be declared inappli-
cable to federal savings and loan associations. 53
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Fairness in Lending Act remains applicable to na-
tional banks but appears inapplicable to federal savings and loan as-
sociations. The state Mortgage Disclosure Act, in its present form, is
surance Corporation (FSLIC), and federal savings and loan associations, 12 U.S.C. §§
1437, 1464, 1725, 1726. 1730 (1976). See 12 C.F.R. Part 528 (1978) (authority note); 43
Fed. Reg. 22332 (1978).
The ECOA contains its own provision for preemption which states that a state law is
not preempted when it gives greater protection than federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 169 ld(f)
(1978). See note 132 supra. Thus, for areas within ECOA, even though such areas may
also be within the scope of the FHLBB's authority from another, less restrictive source,
it might plausibly be argued that this specific statement of congressional intent for the
role of state law in a certain area controls over the general, delegated power of the
FHLBB to regulate federal associations. The areas within the ECOA for which this argu-
ment might be made are credit discrimination based on race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, and marital status. Geographic redlining, however, is not covered by
the ECOA.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act deals only with racial discrimination, and both the 1968
Fair Housing Act and the ECOA, insofar as they apply to redlining, deal only with ra-
cial discrimination. Thus, under these acts the FHLBB's power to prohibit redlining ex-
tends only to redlining with racially discriminatory effect or motivation, not to purely
geographic redlining. And it is, moreover, not clearly the case that Congress intended
these federal laws to exclude state civil rights laws.
In the final analysis, the FHLBB's power to prohibit geographic redlining and its
power to preempt state law in the field are based on the general power of the FHLBB to
supervise the federal savings and loan system and regulate it in the public interest. The
Board has such general power, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976), and the Board's
nondiscrimination regulations are unquestionably a proper exercise of that power.
The second problem raised by the Board's statement of preemption is that the Board
limits the express preemption to federally chartered institutions, although the Board has
the power to regulate state chartered savings and loan associations which are members
of the federal savings and loan system, insured by the FSLIC. The apparent negative im-
plication is that state savings and loan associations are not exclusively governed by
these federal regulations and therefore state laws which are consistent with the federal
regulations can apply to state savings and loan associations.
152. See note 81 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of recent trends in
the preemption doctrine.
153. The court in Washington Savings League, on similar reasoning, recently did
declare the Washington Fairness in Lending Act preempted by the FHLBB nondiscrim-
ination regulations. Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment and Permanent
Injunction at 2-3, Washington Say. League v. Chapman, No. C 78-163S (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 17, 1979).
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not applicable to any federally chartered financial institution. A less
broad reporting measure, however, might be constitutionally applica-
ble to some federal financial institutions. The present statute serves
two purposes. First, it requires the accumulation of data on mortgage
lending and will aid in determining whether and to what extent redlin-
ing and disinvestment exist in Washington. Second, it aids in enforc-
ing the Fairness in Lending Act. Only the former requires comprehen-
sive monitoring of lending which is tantamount to supervision and
preempted by the HMDA. The latter purpose could be served by a
more limited act, applicable to federal financial institutions subject to
the Fairness in Lending Act.
Such an act would have two principal features. First, upon com-
plaint of discrimination based on location, the federal financial insti-
tution in question would be required to turn over the applicant's mort-
gage file to appropriate state or local authorities for investigation.
Second, after a number of complaints from one geographic area or
upon some other showing of good cause, federal financial institutions
would be required to make mortgage disclosure on terms similar to
those in the present act, but only for the particular area in question.154
The present state disclosure law would, of course, continue to ap-
ply to all state chartered financial institutions. A revised act, limited
to enforcement related disclosure from federal institutions subject to
the Fairness in Lending Act would be useful and constitutionally valid
but still not adequate. The need for data to monitor mortgage lending
would persist because the coverage of the revised state act would be
limited and because the information available under the HMDA is not
sufficient.' 5 5 An adequate state law cannot be applied because of the
strong policy of federal regulation of federal institutions; therefore
Congress must be convinced to strengthen federal law.
Richard H. Cleva
154. Visitation problems should not defeat such a statute because requiring reports
as the means of enforcing state law has been approved by the Supreme Court. Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 252-53 (1944). "Since Kentucky may enforce its
statute requiring the surrender to it of presumptively abandoned accounts in national as
well as state banks, it may, as an appropriate incident to this exercise of authority, re-
quire the banks to file reports of inactive accounts, as the statute directs." Id.
Similarly, Congress' presumptive intent in the HMDA arguably goes only to the dis-
closure of comprehensive mortgage lending statistics. State requests for specific and
limited mortgage information in connection with the enforcement of a valid state law in
a particular case or area would not threaten the dual banking system.
155. Compare notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra (information required un-
der Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) with notes 31-35 and accompanying text
supra (information required under Washington Mortgage Disclosure Act).
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